Relativism about Truth and Predicates of Taste
Vol 13, No 2 - suppl. (2012) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
Autor: Barry Smith
Resumo:
Is relativism about truth ever a coherent doctrine? Some people have argued that an answer to this question depends on whether there can be cases of genuine disagreement where those who disagree hold confl icting beliefs towards the same proposition and yet are each entitled to say that what they believe is true. These have been called cases of faultless disagreement and are often explored by considering the case of disagreements about taste. However, this is not the right way to formulate the relativist’s doctrine, and the discussions of taste are often based on a faulty view about the nature of taste and about the workings of predicates of taste. I examine the taste case in more detail and consider the prospects for a genuine form of truth relativism.
ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234
Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2012.132%28suppl%29.03
Palavras-Chave: relativism, truth, taste,predicates of taste
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