Realism, irrealism and truth
Vol 17, No 2 (2016) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
Autor: Nélida Gentile
Resumo:
The purpose of this paper is to analize whether Goodman’s pluralism leaves room for a correspondentist version of truth, in spite of his explicit rejection of this. I will argue that Goodman associates the notion of correspondence exclusively with the perspective of traditional metaphysical realism that he refuses; but pace Goodman, it is perfectly possible to reconcile his pluralism with a correspondence theory of truth. I think that unless pluralism and the correspondence theory of truth can be combined, Goodman’s position is unsustainable due to restrictions he imposes to pluralism.
ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234
Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.172.10
Palavras-Chave: Nelson Goodman,irrealism,correspondence theor
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