Autor: Pablo Lopéz-Silva

Resumo:

This paper explores one of the most fundamental philosophical worries underlying the occurrence of delusions, namely, the problem about the specific type of mental state that grounds a delusional report or, as I shall call it, ‘the typology problem’. The analysis is developed as follows: (i) After formulating and circumscribing the target problem, (ii) I explore the main tenets and advantages of the doxastic view of delusions, perhaps, the strongest candidate currently available within the typology debate. (iii) After, I clarify and evaluate four of the main counter-arguments against the doxastic view offering a number of counter replies to these attacks. (iv) Finally, I conclude that the anti-doxastic argumentation offers no good reasons to abandon the doxastic model and that this model does not need to appeal to external resources to reply to such counter-arguments. At the same time, I finalize with some of the challenges that remain open within the doxastic view.

ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234

Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.172.15

Palavras-Chave: psychosis, delusions,doxastic view of delusio