Inferential limits of Machine?s Intelligence: Can Kant teach us anything about the content of A.I. judgments?
vol. 29, n. 1 (2024) • Philósophos: Revista de Filosofia - Revista UFG
Autor: Lucas Vollet
Abstract:
We argue that a framework for comprehending the basic differences between the mental structures of humans and machines (as they currently exist) is established by Transcendental Analytics' argument in the Critique of Pure Reason. It will be demonstrated that Kant's theory of the synthetic unity of apperception, as established by Transcendental Analytics' argument in the Critique of Pure Reason, along with Dummett's theory of meaning for meaning-theoretical predictions of inferential connections, can assist in establishing this framework. When combined, these form a framework for organizing a coherent differentiation between what we refer to as the conscious grasp of the unity that is present during judgment and the machine-performed manipulation of signs. In the end, we will present an appendix on the underdevelopment of the Kantian framework for distinguishing artificial intelligence from human intelligence.
ISSN: 1982-2928
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v29i1.78657
Texto Completo: https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/78657
Palavras-Chave: Inferentialism, artificial intelligence, synthetic unity of apperception, Dummett, Kant
Philósophos: Revista de Filosofia - Revista UFG
A Revista Philósophos publicou seu primeiro exemplar em 1996. Desde então temos tido como objetivo publicar material bibliográfico inédito e argumentativo na área de filosofia e promover o debate filosófico. Os trabalhos publicados pela Philósophos são sempre de autores dedicados a Pesquisa em Filosofia e que sejam doutores nessa área no Brasil e no exterior. A publicação é semestral, sob a responsabilidade da Faculdade de Filosofia (FAFIL) e do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Goiás. A submissão dos artigos deve ser feita em resposta a chamadas temáticas divulgadas pela revista.