Situations and the Liar Paradoxes
Vol 22, No 1 (2018) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Guilherme Araújo Cardoso
Resumo:
In this paper we intend to outline an introduction to Situation Theory as an approach to the liar paradoxes. This idea was first presented by the work of Barwise and Etchemendy (in their (1987)). First (section 1) we introduce the paradoxes in their most appealing and important versions. Second (section 2) we show that non-classical approaches on the problem usually get puzzled by the revenge problem on one side and loss of expressive power on the other side. Last (sections 3 and 4), we present Situation Theory and try to show how it is capable of solving the old paradoxes and blocking revenge. The price we pay on this view is universality, since it would allow a new revenge situated liar. We don’t intend to address the problem of universality here, but we try at least to motivate the reader to make sense of this theory.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p35
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p35/pdf
Palavras-Chave: Liar paradoxes,Revenge problem, Bivalence,T-s
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2