Autor:

Abstract:

Saul Kripke (1972) argued for the existence of a priori propositions that are contingently true. Kripke uses the example of a case presented by Wittgenstein (1953) about the Standard Meter of Paris. The Standard Meter is an object to determine the standard lenght, in the measure system, of a one meter unit. Wittgenstein argued that we can’t affirm that the Standard Meter has one meter, since it is the standard for measure and works as a rule in the language. Therefore, the phrase “the standard meter has one meter” doesn’t have a truth-value. On the other hand, Kripke argued that that phrase expresses a true proposition and can be known a priori by whom stipulated that this object will be the standard for measure. I will argue in favor a kripkean position, analyzing the dispute and thereafter answering possible objections from proponents of the wittgensteinian position.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p465

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n3p465/31357

Palavras-Chave: Contigent a priori, standard-meter,Saul Kripk