Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue
Vol 19, No 1 (2015) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo
Abstract:
Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33/30576
Palavras-Chave: Reliabilist Defense of Induction,Goodman Para
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
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"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2