Sosa, DeRose y las creencias seguras
Vol 18, No 1 (2014) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Ignacio Vilaró
Abstract:
According to Sosa, in order for a truthful belief to count as knowledge it must be safe (a modal notion which is similar, although not identical, to that of sensitivity). An alleged advantage of this condition of safety, over that of sensitivity, has to do with its capacity to provide a Moorean response to the skeptical Cartesian. DeRose criticizes safety both from a pragmatic and a semantic point of view. I present a slightly different version of his critique putting aside some incidental issues and clarifying what is at stake in his main charge. Sosa’s response is inadequate because it deals only with peripheral aspects.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2014v18n1p135
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n1p135/27783
Palavras-Chave: Mooreanism,skepticism,Sosa, DeRose
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
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"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2