Autor: Otávio Bueno

Abstract:

In this paper, I examine Putnam’s nuanced views in the philosophy of mathematics, distinguishing three proposals: modalism (an interpretation of mathematics in terms of modal logic), quasi-empirical realism (that emphasizes the role and use of quasi-empirical methods in mathematics), and an indispensability view (that highlights the indispensable role of quantification over mathematical objects and the support such quantification provides for a realist interpretation of mathematics). I argue that, as he shifted through these views, Putnam aimed to preserve a semantic realist account of mathematics that avoids platonism. In the end, however, each of the proposals faces significant difficulties. A form of skepticism then emerges

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217/26403

Palavras-Chave: Putnam,indispensability argument,modalism,phi