John Pollock, epistemic externalism, and the problem of naturalizing justification
Vol 17, No 1 (2013) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Arthur Viana Lopes
Abstract:
In this paper we deal with John Pollock’s criticism against externalism—the idea that a proper naturalistic theory of justification has to be internalist. We analyze whether his refutation really affects every form of externalism, particularly, process reliabilism. We present Pollock’s procedural theory of epistemic norms, and discuss if his arguments are effective agains process reliabilism. We claim that the reasons presented do not really put Pollock’s project in advantage.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p19
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p19/26261
Palavras-Chave: Epistemic externalism,naturalism,reliabilism,
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2