Davidson on the impossibility of thought without language: comments on Diana I. Pérez

Vol 16, No 3 (2012) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology

Autor: Marcelo Fischborn

Resumo:

Diana Pérez (2005) criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a weaker and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p489

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n3p489/25621

Palavras-Chave: Thought, Language,Concept of Belief,Davidson

Principia: an international journal of epistemology

"PRINCIPIA
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2