Autor: Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves

Abstract:

The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011) attempts to defend the object view; (3) refine Pautz’ (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) arguments against the object view, which mainly resort to the fact that it cannot account for the grounding role of hallucinatory experiences; (4) and finally adjudicate in favor of the content view and against the overestimation of the naïve intuition.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p417

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n3p417/25612

Palavras-Chave: Content view,object view,representational con