Dualising Intuitionictic Negation
Vol 13, No 2 (2009) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Graham Priest
Abstract:
One of Da Costa's motives when he constructed the paraconsistent logic Cw was to dualise the negation of intuitionistic logic. In this paper I explore a different way of going about this task. A logic is defined by taking the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, and dualising the truth conditions for negation. Various properties of the logic are established, including its relation to CWo Tableau and natural deduction systems for the logic are produced, as are appropriate algebraic structures. The paper then investigates dualising the intuitionistic conditional in the same way. This establishes various connections between the logic, and a logic called in the literature 'Brouwerian logic' or 'closed-set logic'.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2009v13n2p165
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2009v13n2p165/12629
Palavras-Chave: Da Costa; Paraconsistency; Intuitionism; Krip
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2