Doubt undogmatized: pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism and the 'metaepistemological' challenge
Vol 4, No 2 (2000) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Duncan Pritchard
Abstract:
It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certai contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19056/17554
Palavras-Chave: Cartesian scepticism; epistemological externa
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2