The foundherentist view of justication by experience
Vol 4, No 1 (2000) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: James Ryan
Abstract:
I show that Susan Haack's foundherentisit theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any proposition). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certam beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true. This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their jusfication from experience, contrary to coherentism.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19477/17831
Palavras-Chave: Experience; justification; Susan Haack
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2