Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Whole aim in his way of doing Philosophy
Vol 22, No 3 (2018) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Gustavo Augusto Fonseca
Resumo:
In The Principles of Mechanics, physicist Heinrich Hertz argues that instead of replying to the question “what is force?” like physicists and philosophers had been doing unsuccessfully, Newtonian physics should be reformulated without considering “force” a basic concept. Decades after Hertz’s book, Ludwig Wittgenstein considered the physicist’s proposal a perfect model for how philosophical problems should be solved, to the point that he made it the foundation of his way of doing philosophy. This article addresses Wittgenstein’s way of doing philosophy, while it also proposes the reason why he failed in solving the philosophical problems — as did Hertz in his project on reformulating Newtonian physics without considering the concept “force”. And to illustrate Wittgenstein’s failure, it examines his disputes with mathematicians Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing on the foundations of mathematics.
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p411
Palavras-Chave: Ludwig Wittgenstein,Method by examples,Comple
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2