An Objection to the Dispositional Conception of Unconscious Mental Phenomena
Vol 22, No 3 (2018) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Tárik de Athayde Prata
Resumo:
This paper attacks the dispositional theory of unconscious mental phenomena. First, I assess different aspects of consciousness as a property of mental states (section 2). After that, I discuss the description of phenomena in partially dispositional terms (section 3). The assessment of some real cases of our psychological functioning shows that there are at least some unconscious states which have an occurrent mental existence, not a dispositional one (section 4). So, the dispositional theory cannot save the Cartesian view (section 5).
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p507
Palavras-Chave: Disposition, unconscious, mental properties,
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
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"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2