Autor: Roberto Sá Pereira

Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to offer a new metaphysical view of both of the content and the phenomenal or conscious character of visual experience inspired by Kaplan’s semantics of demonstratives. In Kaplan’s account, the character or meaning of a demonstrative type is understood as the function of a particular token of that type (vehicle of content) in the context of the demonstration to the singular content in the context in question. By way of analogy, I want to suggest that the phenomenal character of experience can be best modeled as a function from particular tokens of experience in the context of experiential contact to their singular contents: that is, the particular instantiation of properties with which the subject is in experiential contact in those contexts. Since the meaning of demonstratives can also be described by its token-reflexive rule (the object demonstrated by this token demonstrative in this context of demonstration), we can also think of the phenomenal character as a token-reflexive property of representing whatever is normally causally responsible for this token experience in the context of experiential contact. This is what I called Reflexionism.

ISSN: 0870-5283; 2183-461X

DOI: http://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0531

Texto Completo: https://www.publicacoesfacfil.pt/product.php?id_product=919

Palavras-Chave: content view,phenomenal character of perceptu