Autor: Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez

Abstract:

State Nonconceptualism is the view that perceptual states (not perceptual content) are different in kind from cognitive states (not cognitive content), insofar as a subject could be in perceptual states even if she lacked the concepts necessary to describe those states. Although this position has recently met serious criticism, this piece aims to argue on its behalf. A point I specifically want to highlight is that, thanks to State Nonconceptualism, it is possible to characterize perceptual experiences as nonconceptual or concept-independent without relying on the notion of perceptual content - a feature I term here the content independence of State Nonconceptualism. I think one should welcome this result: for, although a nonconceptualist characterization of perceptual experience is quite plausible, nonrepresentationalist approaches to perception have persuasively challenged the thought that perceptual experiences have representational content. This brief piece is divided into three parts: (i) I introduce two versions of Perceptual Nonconceptualism, namely, Content and State Nonconceptualism; (ii) I go on to stress State Nonconceptualism’s content independence; and (iii), I briefly address three prominent objections against the state nonconceptualist.

ISSN: 1980-539X

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44n2.22.p325

Texto Completo: https://www.scielo.br/j/trans/a/CqkZhwfHqdpT44jj5cWDhSj/?format=html&lang=en

Palavras-Chave: No-Conceptualismo; Contenido Perceptivo; No-Representacionalismo